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INTRODUCTION 
NSW v Fahey [2007] HCA 20 (22 May 2007) was an appeal by the State against the finding that it had 
breached the duty of care it owed to a police officer. The police officer, the respondent, claimed damages in 
negligence for her post-traumatic stress disorder, allegedly the result of the conduct of individual officers 
and the Police Service during and after attending the immediate aftermath of an armed robbery. 
 Special leave was granted by the High Court to determine the issue of breach of duty and to consider 
whether the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 ought to be reconsidered. 
THE ALLEGED BREACH 
On 25 August 1999 the respondent and another police officer were called to a video store in Sydney where 
there had been an attempted armed robbery. The owner of the store had been stabbed and slashed during 
the attack but had been able to make his way to the nearby medical centre. Following the trail of blood, the 
two officers went to the centre and found a doctor attending to the victim in a treatment room. The other 
officer left the room and the doctor requested that the respondent assist. The respondent tended to the 
wound by holding the opening together and trying to stem the bleeding with medical pads as she talked to 
the victim trying to obtain a description of the attackers. As she did this, she relayed the information by 
radio to other officers and called for an ambulance. The respondent was with the victim for approximately 
10 minutes. During this time a senior police officer arrived but he merely took a look into the room and 
walked away, leaving the respondent with the doctor and the victim. The respondent assisted the ambulance 
officers as six or so other police officers stood nearby. 
 It was accepted that the respondent suffered a post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of these events. 
The respondent alleged that the appellant had: 
• failed to provide adequate precautions her safety; 
• placed the respondent in a position of peril; 
• failed to provide proper and adequate assistance at the scene of the armed robbery; 
• failed to counsel or adequately counsel the respondent; and 
• failed to provide proper and adequate debriefing. 
 At trial, evidence was given that officers were assigned to work in pairs and it was expected that each 
officer would look out for the other in the partnership. A former police officer gave evidence that at a crime 
scene where a person was injured, “you do what you can do” (at [42]) and that no rules can be made as to 
how two officers would go about their work in such a situation. The trial judge held that the psychiatric 
injury suffered by the respondent was clearly foreseeable and by leaving the respondent without proper 
support during and after a very traumatic event, there was a lack of reasonable care. No evidence was given 
to demonstrate how a system of work would govern the situation of two officers attending such a scene. 
 The New South Wales Court of Appeal dismissed the State’s appeal finding that the findings of the 
trial judge supported the finding of a breach of duty, ie that what had happened to the respondent was “not 
consistent with the implementation of a safe system of work” (at [51]). 
 On appeal to the High Court, the appellant argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in not identifying 
what was the safe system of work that should have been adopted and that the court should reconsider the 
decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt. 
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT: APPLYING THE CALCULUS OF SHIRT 
Three members of the court agreed that the correctness of the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt did 
not need reconsideration. As noted by Gummow and Hayne JJ (at [78]) “that Shirt has not always been 
applied properly does not provide any persuasive reason to reconsider its correctness”. In dissent, Gleeson 
CJ and Kirby J agreed. Gleeson CJ held (at [7]): “In cases where the principles [of Wyong Shire Council v 
Shirt] have been misapplied, that may have been the result of a failure to read the most frequently quoted 
passage in the context of the whole of Mason J’s judgment.” 
 Kirby J stated (at [122]): “If there has been an incorrect application by trial courts of the full force of 
the formulation expressed by Mason J in Shirt, that is not a weakness in this court’s formulation. It simply 
shows that the ‘calculus’ has not been given its full operation.” 
 Only Callinan and Heydon JJ thought that the case for reconsideration of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt 
was strong (at [224]), stating that not all appeals concerning breach are based on the misapplication of the 
decision and that the test laid down in the decision is “unrealistic and difficult in practice” (at [221]). 
However, the case before the High Court did not require the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt to be 
overruled nor did it need to consider what test should replace it (at [226]). Crennan J held that as the risk in 
the case was clearly foreseeable there was no opportunity to reconsider Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (at 
[241]). 
 However, in applying the calculus of the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt to determine a 
reasonable employer’s response to the risk of foreseeable psychiatric injury, the court was divided 4:3 in 
finding that the appellant had not breached its duty of care.  
 Gummow and Hayne JJ, in a joint judgment, allowed the appeal finding that although the risk of 
psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable, regarding the expectation that officers assigned to work 
together will support each other: “the worse the incident is, the more likely it is that officers will not be able 
to spend any time supporting each other because they will be fully occupied in controlling the situation and 
dealing with its consequences” (at [67]). Their Honours were of the opinion that this expectation was in 
conflict with the tasks required to be carried out by police officers under the Police Service Act 1990 
(NSW), a factor that was identified by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (at 47) as relevant in 
identifying the reasonable response to the risk (at [72]). 
 Callinan and Heydon JJ (at [208]) held that the appellant did not have to provide and maintain a system 
of work that required the presence of two officers except when that is not possible as a real necessity. Their 
Honours did not believe that necessity had to be proven in cases where an officer worked alone, noting (at 
[207]): 
 
the fact that the possibility of danger or stress is a regular incident of a particular occupation, is also an indication that 
emergencies and events calling for a division of labour, and a need and capacity for improvisation or adaptation on the 
part of the officer coping alone, will inevitably occur. 
 The duty of care owed by the appellant included the requirement to provide a safe system of work. 
However there was no obligation upon the appellant to have a system of work that would almost always 
have two officers together and the other measures taken by the appellant such as the training and the very 
“inevitable exigencies of police work generally” negated such a requirement (at [212]). 
 Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Crennan JJ were in the minority. The Chief Justice gave a brief judgment 
agreeing with the findings of Spigelman CJ of the Court of Appeal that, as the respondent’s partner had not 
established that his absence was reasonable, there was a failure to provide a safe system of work. Gleeson 
CJ simply noted (at [11]): 
 
Nobody suggested that it would be possible to prescribe with any precision the circumstances in which two police 
officers, working as a pair, should or should not separate. The decision in the present case was that there was a 
recognised risk of stress-related injury, that the Service had responded to the risk by requiring police officers working 
in pairs to give one another support and assistance unless there was some reason for separating, that Senior Constable 
Evans had shown no reason for leaving the respondent alone, and that the respondent’s exposure to the trauma of the 
victim in the doctor’s surgery without any help from her partner was a cause of her psychiatric injury. 
 Kirby J applied the calculus of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt in his decision (at [165]). Noting that the 
risk of injury was foreseeable to a reasonable employer, his Honour then considered what a reasonable 
employer would do in response to that risk. It was reasoned (at [165]): 
 
The magnitude of the risk was significant. That risk demanded affirmative and institutional responses in the context of 
an employee exposed to such a risk. The degree of probability of the occurrence of the risk was great given the near 
certainty that, in the course of their duties, police constables and other police officers would be repeatedly exposed to 
conditions of trauma in an employment culture traditionally unsympathetic to revelations of perceived stress or 
weakness. The expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action are real. But insufficient appears to 
have been done to publicise the availability of confidential trauma counselling. 
 But in his consideration of conflicting responsibilities, Kirby J held that the consideration of the duties 
of police officers did not “trump” the duty of the employer (at 166]). His Honour was influenced by the 
evidence that the respondent’s partner was not otherwise engaged at the time (at [167]). This was a finding 
of fact and his Honour held it supported and confirmed, the conclusion of the lower courts, that there had 
been a breach of duty.  
 Crennan J, also in dissent, found that the system of work set up by the appellant was the reasonable 
and obvious system to address the foreseeable risks. However, although the respondent’s partner was not 
required to remain with her for every minute she was attending to the victim, it was not demonstrated that 
providing her with support and assistance was incompatible with his other duties at the time (at [262]) and 
therefore there was a breach of duty (at [265]). 
CONCLUSION 
Assessing what a reasonable person’s response to the risk of injury would be, although said to be objective, 
clearly cannot be predicted with certainty in all scenarios. Even when confronted with the same evidence 
and applying the same considerations, not all members of a court will come to the same conclusion. The 
decision of NSW v Fahy is an example of how the calculus of negligence is not a formula but a balancing 
process, as explained by Kirby J at [125]: 
 
[T]he reference to the Shirt formulation as a “calculus” is not intended to suggest a mathematical or scientific precision 
in the endeavour. The very components of the “calculus” deny any such expectation, most (if not all) of them being 
insusceptible to exact computation. 
 This case demonstrates that in applying the calculus of negligence as stated in Wyong Shire Council v 
Shirt, and now also enacted in the various Civil Liability Acts,1 decision makers are influenced by different 
things – giving different weight to considerations when balancing up all of the relevant factors to make a 
conclusion as to breach. The issue of breach may be a question of fact – but it is not necessarily a fact that 
cannot be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
                                                          
1 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B. 
